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The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

Chris Mayer National Security and Strategy Consultant

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Exploring changes in the practice of war while the fundamental nature and principles of war are unchanging. Includes mercenaries, PMSC, Hybrid Warfare, revolution in military affairs. For in-depth information see my blog at blog.ctmayer.net
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The video game industry has come a long way since Pac Man, but with all of these companies out there, how can we possibly know who's WINNING at MAKING VIDEO GAMES?!? Fear not! Hosts Brian Bishop, Mike Matthews and Moses Agboola cover the video game industries' hottest news stories every week and rank every company, so we can once and for all, every week, every month and every year FINALLY put it to rest: Who Won Video Games in this age of... MODERN CONSOLE WARFARE.
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In a recent episode of my podcast series of “The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare” (E104) I described possibilities for an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Of course, any end to any armed conflict requires the agreement of both (or all) parties to the conflict. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is no different. It is entirely possible, perhaps likely, that …
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Last week, I attended the annual “Summit” meeting of the International Stability Operations Association, or #ISOA. This association includes 200 private corporations that support U.S. and friendly government engagement across the spectrum of stability, conflict, and post conflict operations. Presentations included speakers from the US Departments o…
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Is a negotiated peace possible, or even desirable between Russia and Ukraine? How can this be done without validating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and encouragement of future aggression? These are critical questions to address as the incoming U.S. administration states that negotiating an end to that war and our involvement in it as one of its firs…
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We often hear that this or that military attack caused disproportionate civilian casualties. Most often, these accusations are directed against Israel, when they are not directed against the United States. I will be generous and presume that most of these accusations are based on a misconception of what proportionality in armed conflict means, and …
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What is the common theme to mercenaries, natural resources, hypersonic missiles, Gaza, and exploding pagers? I can think of several, but in a recent conversation with a colleague of mine, that common thread was challenges to the Law of War, or International Humanitarian Law. Can the notion of the law of war even survive in modern manifestations of …
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The fighting in the Kursk Oblast is still ongoing, and it would be much to soon to derive any lessons to be learned from this event. This episode picks up from the previous episode, examining how this campaign might offer examples of concepts presented in previous podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. Ukraine continues maneuver warfare at …
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The war in Ukraine has taken a very interesting, and I think, exciting turn of events. The advent of combined arms maneuver warfare reminiscent of armored offensives in that region eight decades ago. It is impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis at this time. There is too much going on and we really know little about order of battle or Ukrainian…
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Clausewitz’s descriptions of friction, taken with the often antagonistic interplay among his trinity of passion, policy, and probability, keep war in theory separate from war in practice. How does this look in real war? In this episode, I make my best guess about how friction and chaotic trinity might affect Russia’s “special military operation” in…
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Clausewitz wrote that there are three forces at work when a nation goes to war: “unbridled passion,” reason, and the play of chance and probability. Things only work well when each of these is held in equilibrium by the other two. The people, the government, and the military represent these forces and the government should, in theory, maintain that…
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War is really very simple, but Clausewitz cautioned that by saying that in war, even the simplest thing is difficult, sometime insurmountable. This idea, which he called “Friction” he maintained was the one thing that made war in theory different from war in practice. The elements that create friction in war also apply to the effort to move from wa…
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If the only acceptable outcome of war is a peace, and the only sustainable peace is a just peace, then it is essential to answer the question, “what is peace?” This is a simple question, but without a simple answer. It has been debated from Plato up until the present day. This lack of definition may be one reason why the transition from war to peac…
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The subject of Just War, or Justum Bellum, is a frequent topic in these podcasts. If, however, the only acceptable justification for any war is to establish a more just and lasting peace, shouldn’t there be a similar framework for Just Peace, or Justum Pacem? Just War theory goes back to Plato and Aristotle, but Just Peace thinking is a product of …
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In Chapter 17 of the Prince, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that a prince ought to desire to be thought of as clement and not cruel. It is more important, he said, to generate a respectful fear which, in then end, is actually more merciful than those who pursue reputations of mercy. Under no circumstances, however, should the prince become hated. This co…
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Just as it takes two parties to agree to fight a war, it takes both parties to agree to peace. Getting both warring parties to agree to peace sometimes requires a third party. This third party provides “good offices” to help both sides agree on what peace should look like. It also helps when each party understands the political objectives of the ot…
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Ending a war begins when one side or the other believes that the cost of continuing to fight exceeds any expectations of success. This could be a simple cost benefit calculation, it could be that continuing to fight after a major defeat is unlikely to bring success, or that the war aims have already been achieved and any further violence is unjusti…
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My podcasts on The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare presented the elements of war that I think every citizen should know in holding our elected representatives responsible for decisions about going to and prosecuting war. The time has come in this series to move from war to peace. The most important consideration in going to and in prosecuting war is …
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“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.” So begins L.P. Hartley’s book, The Go-Between. Although the way people do things changes over time, what they do remains largely the same. War and politics are human endeavors, and human nature is unchanging. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the nature of war and politics i…
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“Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.” My purpose in my podcasts of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare. But who is Sun Tzu, and how is what he said relevant to modern warfare? Music…
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Who is this Clausewitz guy? The Army War College studies many different theories and theorists of war, from Thucydides of ancient Athens, Sun Tzu of Wu Dynasty in China, to Machiavelli, Mitchell, and present day theorists. One name stands out among the others, the early 19th century enlightenment era military philosopher, the Prussian Major General…
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There are more than 110 armed conflicts in the world today.[1] Ending any one of them requires more than a simple cease fire, it requires knowing what each side intends to achieve by the conflict. This is even true when the participants may not fully understand the end state they are seeking. This includes the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle Ea…
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If I initiate a war, it seems logical that I would know why I am starting that war and what I expect to achieve by it. It might also be helpful if I let my opponent know that, too, as it may help limit the intensity duration, and long-term effects of that war. Why that is and how that does or doesn’t reflect reality is the subject of this and follo…
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The Wagner Group is only one of about two dozen Russian sponsored semi-private military companies conducting combat operations in Ukraine, Africa, and elsewhere. If the operations of the companies violate relevant national and international laws, why aren’t criminal charges being filed against Wagner, affiliated entities, and its operatives? I beli…
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If we can agree that Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the legal criteria of being mercenaries, nor are they legitimate members of the armed forces, then their participation in combat must be illegitimate and their actions criminal. The question remains how to hold those criminal combatants accountable under law. This episode explore…
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If the Wagner Group and two dozen or so similar Russian paramilitary forces are not mercenaries, not PMSCs, not militia or volunteer corps, then what are they? If the term terrorist to too vague and a criminal organization insufficient, then what can we call them that facilitates accountability for their criminal behavior? Maybe, jut calling them c…
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If Wagner and similar Russian mercenary-like organizations do not meet the internationally accepted criteria for being mercenaries or Private Military and Security Companies, then what are they? This podcast explores the suitability of other terms, including militia, volunteer corps, terrorist, and criminal organizations. The challenge is to find a…
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Whether the infamous Wagner continues to exist or not, the problem they created is only growing. There may be more than 30 Russian paramilitary organizations operating across the world, many of them fighting in Ukraine. At least one has a reputation from brutality and criminal conduct rivaling Wagner’s. But what do we call them? They do not fulfil …
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The presence of Private Security Companies, or PSCs, in conditions of armed conflict continues to be an item of concern to the international community. PSCs seem to blur the distinction between combatants and civilians. They use force, but are not members of the armed forces. Rules for the Use of Force, appropriate to PSC tasks and restrictions und…
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The mission of the US Army is to fight and win our nation’s wars. That, however, is not the only task we ask the Army to perform in potentially hostile environments. Missions such as military support to civil authority, humanitarian assistance missions, and disaster relief are not governed by the law of war, but by human rights law. In this context…
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How do rules of engagement promote compliance with the laws of war when those fighting war seem to do so without any basic consideration of humanity? I think that to answer this question, we must revisit the laws and customs of war, sometimes called International Humanitarian Law. This includes understanding that not every act of violence in war is…
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Rules of engagement, or ROE, often get a bad reputation. But what are rules of engagement and why do we need them? If well constructed, ROE focus military action, manage risk of unintended consequences, such as escalation of the conflict and violations of the law of war, and as an economy of force, by minimizing unproductive action. On the other ha…
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It is probable that Russia’s lack of success in Ukraine gives the People’s Republic of China cause for reconsidering any existing plans for an invasion of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Perhaps, using the PRC’s unrestricted war model, they might instead resort to pursuing limited aims that will set conditions for later strategic victory. In other…
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Wagner is dead, or apparently so. At least the senior leadership of PMC Wagner, along with Wagner himself, Dmitri Utkin. What does this mean? Anyone who says they know is either deluding you or deluding themselves. Although the specifics may be in doubt, I believe that Wagner will continue in some form if not in that name. Prigozhin’s statement fro…
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Does the recent coup in Niger affect US security interests, or is it just one more coup on a coup plagued continent? Or is it something more than that? Could it be the next campaign in a Hybrid War? If so, who are the contestants? Disclaimer: The information in these podcasts is my own opinion and does not represent that of the US Army War College,…
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Clausewitz wrote that war is an act of violence to force the enemy to do our will. But what is that “will?” A 2019 Rand Study found that there is no official or agreed definition of “will” in the context of warfighting. In this episode, I tackle the question of what will means, why it is important, and the dangers going to war without a national wi…
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Strategy is the application of ways and means to achieve an end. But what are means? This podcast describes the need to look beyond the weapons and other warfighting platforms to, instead, identify the capabilities needed to fight wars. Weapons systems and other elements of national power are resources to enable those capabilities. Disclaimer: The …
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What if I told you that civilians can attend the US Army War College? Not US Government employees, but civilians from all walks of life and professions? Two times each year, the Army War College offers that opportunity through its National Security Seminar and Commandant's National Security Program. In this podcast, I describe that program and inte…
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The decision whether to help Ukraine is not as black and white as it may appear. Episode 69 described reasons the United States and other nations should help Ukraine. In this episode, I address the other side, reasons why helping Ukraine is either wrong or dangerous. Choosing the right path forward requires us to understand both sides of the argume…
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Why does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine affect us, or other nations? Isn’t that a matter between Russia and Ukraine? Isn’t our involvement only risking escalation and perhaps a global war? In short, why should we care? This episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare address the first part, why we should care. The next episode will describe and eval…
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What is going on in Russia? Has Prigozhin lost his mind? Or is Wagner merely chess pieces being manipulated by a political chess master? I offer this special podcast in the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare to review points from previous podcasts on Wagner and military coups in light of breaking events in Russia. Even if this is all over by the time yo…
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On February 23, 2022, the Russian Federation violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine – for the second time in a decade – calling it a “special military operation.” It certainly looks more like a war, but is it really a war? This podcast looks at the current Russian invasion in light of the definitions of war in Episode 7, which include war in…
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The United States of America is a republic founded on democratic principles. Not a democracy, but a republic. That means that, except in rare circumstances, the citizens do not vote on issues at the national level. Instead, we elect representatives of the people and of the component states of the United States to make those decisions. That does not…
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Why do we study old battles? Historic examples of strategy help us to understand enduring lessons about why nations win or don’t win wars. But historic battles and campaigns were fought using weapons, tactics, and other technology that have little relevance to modern warfare. What is the value in studying them and if we should, then how should we g…
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In Episode 64, Why Wagner, I said one possible risk associated the Wagner Group is the potential that, like previous elite and ostensibly politically reliable mercenary forces, Wagner could be a threat to the Russian government. But what is the likelihood of that happening? This episode explores how military or paramilitary forces might turn on the…
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In the past few months, Moscow has used the Wagner Group as the centerpiece in recent military operations in Ukraine. This is very different from how Wagner has been used in Africa. Why is Putin giving a quasi-mercenary organization such a central and visible role in its war with Ukraine? There could be different reasons, each of which present adva…
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The difference between war and terrorism is that war is, in theory, governed by international law, whereas terrorism is criminal in nature and execution. So where does that leave the use of mercenaries in modern warfare, and particularly the infamous Wagner Group? Are they terrorists? Are they legitimate combatants? Are they both or something else?…
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If there is one thing that pacifists and generals agree on, it is that war is terrible. The dictionary definition of terrible is “causing terror.” If war, by its very nature, causes terror, then what is the difference between war and terrorism? I explore that in this episode, leading up to the next episode, where I will apply this information to th…
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What if I told you that neither Total War or Limited War reflect reality? Further that the West's concept of limited war only limits the ability of states to achieve the only acceptable goal of any war? For further reading: Stoker, Donald, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the present, ISBN978-1-009-22086-6 …
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With the current war in Ukraine, it may seem obvious that conventional war is still important. But less than a year ago, many prominent military experts said otherwise. Some writers and opinion leaders still maintain that the current conflict is an exception, an aberration, and focusing on conventional war, or traditional warfare does not prepare u…
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Twitter and You Tube can present an inaccurate picture of modern warfare. In the previous Podcast, I described how the tank continues to be relevant on the modern battlefield, despite social media images. This same social media depicts Combat aviation of all varieties falling from the sky on a daily basis, without apparent battlefield effect. Col. …
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Video clips show Russian tanks in Ukraine blowing up after being hit by various anti-tank guided missiles. Moscow has lost so many tanks that some reports say they are forced to pull obsolete models from reserve stocks or even museums. The conclusion in popular media is that the tank is dead, obsolete as a weapon of modern combat. I think that the …
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